The change to the electoral law that is being talked about suggests that municipal executives will follow the existing model for parish councils: what will be elected is the municipal assembly, and the mayor will be the first name on the list with the most votes.
It took the far right to become the second party in Parliament - and threaten the near duopoly of the dominant parties in Portuguese municipalities in the upcoming October elections - so that the party with the biggest predictable losses began to talk about putting an end to the existing sprain in the composition of municipal executives.
Unlike in other European municipalities - despite their many differences - the composition of Portuguese municipal executives is determined by the same proportionality rules that apply to elections to the Portuguese Parliament. In other countries, municipal executives are made up of elected representatives or people appointed by the party that won the elections, or who have managed to establish an agreement or coalition that guarantees them a majority in the municipality's government, In our country, the executive is made up of those who “govern” and the “opposition”.
The situation is all the more bizarre because the same principle did not apply to the parish councils, in which it was decided to set up a homogeneous party or coalition executive, emanating from the parish assembly.
The drawbacks of the current system and the consequent lack of efficiency in the management of public affairs that it normally entails are all too obvious: either you have a majority in the municipal executive or it is automatically paralyzed in its action if it doesn't benefit from the benevolence or mitigated collaboration of the “opposition”. To give just one relevant example, this is what happened with António Costa's first term on the Lisbon City Council (2007/9), where, at the beginning, he didn't have a majority of councillors. To make things even more complicated, the majority of MPs in the municipal assembly (the legislative and supervisory body of the municipal executive) was not in his favor either. At the time, his negotiating skills paid off and he reached agreements with three independent councillors, thus obtaining the majority of nine councillors that gave him the majority to govern.
What is the explanation for this peculiarity of Portuguese municipal executives? To understand this, we have to go back to the beginning of the democratic process that followed April 25. Under the previous regime, mayors were appointed by the national government and there was no municipal executive. In many cases, particularly in smaller municipalities, the mayor was often replaced in day-to-day management by the vice-mayor, who was also appointed by the government.
Those appointed to these positions were personalities of the regime, with local prestige and belonging to the better-off classes, representative of the dominant interests in the municipality or members of the corporate organizations on which the regime was based. As there were no term limits, some of these personalities held these positions for many years and had considerable influence in their municipalities.
With the establishment of democracy, there was a fear that these same people might be elected in municipalities where the right-wing and center parties were dominant in the Constituent Assembly elections, not least because many of them recruited them in the early stages of democracy. On the other hand, particularly in the south of the country, there were fears that the PCP's monocolor executives would take over municipal executives and develop a counterpower to the national government.
A formula was thus found that would bring the minority parties into the executive itself, thus allowing them to exert some control over it. One of the consequences of this “solution”, which is less talked about, is the diminishing the functions of the municipal assembly itself, which no longer has propositional powers, The vote was practically limited to voting on the plan and budget, the annual accounts, municipal regulations and land management instruments.
Fifty years after the establishment of democracy, the arguments put forward at the time, which were already questionable, have now become unfounded. On the contrary, it is now clear that this composition of municipal executives has obvious drawbacks in terms of achieving the objectives voted for by the electorate, introduces inefficiencies in management - situations of deadlock when there are no majorities are increasingly common - and hinders real accountability for those who win the elections and appoint the mayor. there's always the excuse that the “opposition won't let us govern” -In addition, by making the municipal assemblies smaller, it severely limits the control of the municipal council when it is governed by an absolute majority.
Now imagine how this system will work with municipal executives with far-right councillors who can block decisions or, even worse, with an absolute majority of these parties without the municipal assembly having the power to act effectively. You only need one extra vote to become mayor!
The change to the electoral law that is being talked about suggests that municipal executives will follow the existing model for parish councils: what will be elected is the municipal assembly, and the mayor will be the first name on the list with the most votes. The composition of the executive will emanate from the assembly, requiring its approval. In addition to these positive changes, we believe that at least two others should be considered. As with the nomination of the prime minister, the mayor to be nominated will be the first name on the list with the most votes, but his or her executive must be approved by the assembly. If this doesn't happen, another candidate can be put forward who meets the conditions to have their executive approved. This is currently the case in Barcelona, where the alcalde (mayor) is not from the party with the most votes and the most elected representatives, but the one that managed to form a coalition that won a majority in the assembly.
On the other hand, in order to strengthen the assembly's powers, it should be able to present and approve proposals in areas that are currently the exclusive competence of the council, such as municipal regulations or the drafting of territorial management instruments, as well as the possibility of dismissing the municipal executive under certain conditions through a motion of constructive censure.
These are changes that deserve an in-depth discussion that will certainly not be possible to complete in time for the next local elections. However, it is important to reach a solid compromise that will allow them to be implemented in the next elections. The surprises that are expected in relation to the results of the October 12 elections will highlight the need to do so, otherwise we will be driving another nail into the democratic system.
This article was published originally here, This article was published in July 2025 and has been republished with the author's permission.
